diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'linux/patches/bugs.c.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | linux/patches/bugs.c.patch | 156 |
1 files changed, 156 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/linux/patches/bugs.c.patch b/linux/patches/bugs.c.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e585e23 --- /dev/null +++ b/linux/patches/bugs.c.patch @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c.new 2022-04-21 10:22:57.337425325 -0400 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c 2022-04-21 10:34:47.550249356 -0400 +@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ + + #include "cpu.h" + ++#ifndef CONFIG_M486 + static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); +@@ -45,6 +46,7 @@ + static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void); + static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void); ++#endif // CONFIG_M486 + + /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR that always has to be preserved. */ + u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base; +@@ -112,6 +114,7 @@ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) + x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_M486 + /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ + spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); + spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); +@@ -127,6 +130,7 @@ + * mitigation until after TAA mitigation selection is done. + */ + mds_print_mitigation(); ++#endif // CONFIG_M486 + + arch_smt_update(); + +@@ -248,6 +252,7 @@ + [MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV] = "Vulnerable: Clear CPU buffers attempted, no microcode", + }; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_M486 + static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void) + { + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) { +@@ -274,6 +279,7 @@ + + pr_info("%s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]); + } ++#endif // CONFIG_M486 + + static int __init mds_cmdline(char *str) + { +@@ -317,6 +323,7 @@ + [TAA_MITIGATION_TSX_DISABLED] = "Mitigation: TSX disabled", + }; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_M486 + static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void) + { + u64 ia32_cap; +@@ -388,6 +395,7 @@ + out: + pr_info("%s\n", taa_strings[taa_mitigation]); + } ++#endif // CONFIG_M486 + + static int __init tsx_async_abort_parse_cmdline(char *str) + { +@@ -463,6 +471,7 @@ + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl); + } + ++#ifndef CONFIG_M486 + static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void) + { + u64 ia32_cap; +@@ -487,6 +496,7 @@ + update_srbds_msr(); + pr_info("%s\n", srbds_strings[srbds_mitigation]); + } ++#endif // CONFIG_M486 + + static int __init srbds_parse_cmdline(char *str) + { +@@ -504,6 +514,7 @@ + #undef pr_fmt + #define pr_fmt(fmt) "L1D Flush : " fmt + ++#ifndef CONFIG_M486 + enum l1d_flush_mitigations { + L1D_FLUSH_OFF = 0, + L1D_FLUSH_ON, +@@ -528,10 +539,12 @@ + return 0; + } + early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse_cmdline); ++#endif // CONFIG_M486 + + #undef pr_fmt + #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V1 : " fmt + ++#ifndef CONFIG_M486 + enum spectre_v1_mitigation { + SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE, + SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO, +@@ -618,6 +631,7 @@ + return 0; + } + early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); ++#endif // CONFIG_M486 + + #undef pr_fmt + #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt +@@ -729,6 +743,7 @@ + { "seccomp,ibpb", SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_SECCOMP_IBPB, false }, + }; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_M486 + static void __init spec_v2_user_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure) + { + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) != secure) +@@ -1071,6 +1086,7 @@ + /* Set up IBPB and STIBP depending on the general spectre V2 command */ + spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(cmd); + } ++#endif // CONFIG_M486 + + static void update_stibp_msr(void * __unused) + { +@@ -1207,6 +1223,7 @@ + { "seccomp", SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_SECCOMP }, /* Disable Speculative Store Bypass via prctl and seccomp */ + }; + ++#ifndef CONFIG_M486 + static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void) + { + enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO; +@@ -1316,6 +1333,7 @@ + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS)) + pr_info("%s\n", ssb_strings[ssb_mode]); + } ++#endif // CONFIG_M486 + + #undef pr_fmt + #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Speculation prctl: " fmt +@@ -1573,6 +1591,7 @@ + enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO; + EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation); + ++#ifndef CONFIG_M486 + /* + * These CPUs all support 44bits physical address space internally in the + * cache but CPUID can report a smaller number of physical address bits. +@@ -1926,3 +1945,4 @@ + return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRBDS); + } + #endif ++#endif // CONFIG_M486 |